University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
College of the Pacific Faculty Articles

All Faculty Scholarship

10-18-2012

How would the world look if it looked as if it were encoded as an
intertwined set ofprobability density distributions?
Michael Madary
University of the Pacific, mmadary@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facarticles
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Madary, M. (2012). How would the world look if it looked as if it were encoded as an intertwined set
ofprobability density distributions?. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1–2. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00419
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facarticles/753

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in College of the Pacific Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

General Commentary

published: 18 October 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00419

How would the world look if it looked as if it were encoded as
an intertwined set of probability density distributions?
Michael Madary*
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany
*Correspondence: madary@uni-mainz.de
Edited by:
Shimon Edelman, Cornell University, USA
Reviewed by:
Axel Cleeremans, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
In the target article, Andy Clark addresses
the question of how a probabilistic predictive coding model of the mind relates
to our personal level mental lives. This
question, he suggests, is “potentially the
most important” (MS46). The question is
important indeed, but Clark’s answer fails
to capitalize on another possible advantage
of this approach. Clark suggests that there
is a disconnect between the way the world
appears to us, on one hand, and the way
that it is represented in the brain, on the
other. He deals with this disconnect by limiting the scope of the theory, by pointing
out that he is discussing a theory of how
brains encode and process information, not
a theory about how things seem to organisms with such brains. The shortcoming
of this strategy is that there may not be a
disconnect to begin with. That is, perhaps
the world does appear to us as if it were
“encoded as an intertwined set of probability density distributions” (MS47). If such is
the case, then explanations which appeal to
a probabilistic predictive model gain even
more scope and power. Here I will offer a
sketch of both a priori and empirical support for my claim.
One emerging theme in the philosophical literature is that perception involves
implicit anticipation of the way appearances change (Noë, 2004; Siegel, 2006;
Madary, 2012). Here is an outline of the
motivation behind this view. The fact that
we are embodied perceivers entails that we
are always limited to a single perspective
on the world at one time. Perception faces
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the task of representing properties despite
only having access to a single appearance of
those properties at any time. A straightforward way to handle this task is to represent
properties by implicitly anticipating how
appearances of those properties will change
as we move. As those anticipations are fulfilled, we gain more evidence for our representation. It would be natural, following
Clark and others, to account for perceptual
anticipations in a probabilistic manner. If
an object looks like a tree from one perspective, it is probable that it will continue
to look like a tree from other perspectives.
This kind of perceptual anticipation is not
usually the center of our attention, but,
crucially, neither is it hidden away in subpersonal code. We can plainly observe the
changing appearances of static properties
and we are surprised when appearances do
not change as they should.
This point raises the tricky question of
the relationship between personal level surprise, on one hand, and the sub-personal
prediction error, known as “surprisal,” on
the other (MS5). Personal level surprise is
an experience with which we are all familiar, and sub-personal surprisal is a key
component of the approach that Clark is
exploring. The relationship between the
two strikes me as an important unsolved
issue. In the target article, Clark offers a
reconciliation for the apparent disconnect between personal level surprise and
sub-personal surprisal (MS46). Elsewhere,
though, Clark concedes that “Although the
psychological notion of surprise is distinct,
events with high surprisal are generally surprising” (Friston et al., 2012, p. 1). I suggest
that an account of when and why surprisal
(sub-personal) is surprising (personal) will
be key for addressing the larger question of
the relationship between sub-personal level

processing and personal level phenomenology. Leaving this difficult issue aside, now
consider the psychological evidence that
suggests vision is indeterminate, evidence
which may fit nicely with the suggestion
that visual processing uses probabilistic
coding.
Two lines of empirical evidence show
that visual perception is an ongoing process which involves repeated sampling of
the environment. Such a structure to visual
perception fits naturally with a probabilistic interpretation: we take repeated samples
in order to update our best estimate of the
way the world is. First, our experience of
the visual periphery is highly indeterminate (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). We are
able to experience parts of the world in a
determinate manner through our ability
continuously to gain different perspectives
through action (Findlay and Gilchrist,
2003). Second, both inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998) and change
blindness (Rensink et al., 1997) paradigms
suggest that our experience of the world
can lack basic details. Both of these lines of
evidence fit nicely with an understanding
of visual experience as probabilistic. The
indeterminacy of the visual periphery can
be interpreted as a probabilistic representational format. Similarly, the missing details
as revealed in inattentional and change
blindness experiments reveal that our generative models are more successful with the
gist of a visual scene and offer only vague
estimates about the details.
In short, both the general a priori structure of perception and recent evidence in
perceptual psychology converge on the
theme that visual experience involves indeterminate implicit anticipations. This theme
fits quite well with the suggestion, explored
by Clark, that the brain actively predicts
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sensory inputs in a probabilistic manner.
Far from the conflict that Clark supposes,
the predictive generative model of perceptual processing might complement our best
account of the phenomenology of vision.
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